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REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
AND ITS ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS
Jeffrey S. Morton*
I first became acquainted with the International Law Commission (ILC)
in 1986 when I was selected to participate in the ILC’s International Law
Training Seminar (Seminar). The three-week Seminar, which is housed in the
United Nations (UN) European Headquarters in Geneva each summer, brings
together 24 young professionals to expose them to the ILC’s work and train
them in the field of international law. The Seminar, like the ILC, limits
participation to one person per nationality. To be selected as the American
member of the Seminar was a tremendous honor, and the experience in
Geneva that summer marked a major turning point in my career. Started in
1966, the ILC’s summer Seminar has provided training to more than 1,000
aspiring international lawyers, academics, and government officials.
The Seminar met as a group each morning and received lectures from
members of the ILC. We were hosted by the mayor of Geneva and
participated in site visits to many of the international organizations that are
headquartered in the city. During the afternoon, Seminar students sat in on
ILC debates, which provided us with a first-hand experience of how the ILC
codifies and progressively develops international law. Because the room used
by the ILC for its work is modest in size, Seminar students sat within a few
feet of ILC members. The attitude of ILC members was always collegial and
hospitable; they often went out of their way to introduce themselves to us and
were often curious about our interests and career paths. My most memorable
exchange with an ILC member occurred when Ambassador Abdul Koroma
of Sierra Leone, a future judge on the International Court of Justice, placed
his hand on my shoulder and said, “I was a member of the Law Commission’s
Summer Training Seminar when I was about your age, perhaps when you are
my age you will be a member of the Commission.”
Watching the ILC operate over the course of the summer of 1986, I was
struck by the intellectual power in the room. Future UN Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt demonstrated a sharpness of mind that I’ve
yet to see others parallel. Gaetan Arangio-Ruiz (Italy), Laurel Francis
(Jamaica), Jiahua Huang (China), Ahmed Mahiou (Lebanon), Paul Reuter
(France), Willem Riphagen (Netherlands), Abdul Koroma (Sierra Leone), Sir
Ian Sinclair (United Kingdom), Sompong Sucharitkul (Thailand) and Nikoai
*
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Ushakov (Soviet Union) are ILC members that particularly stick out in my
memory as being of remarkable legal mind.
In addition to the formal morning and afternoon sessions at the UN
headquarters, I was also invited to four lunch and/or dinner parties hosted by
ILC members. These occasions were opportunities to interact with ILC
members, and oftentimes their families, in a casual environment.
Elected by the General Assembly for five-year terms, ILC members are
charged with debating key deficiencies in international law, suggesting the
codification of existing customary law, and advancing or progressively
developing international law into new areas. Throughout our training, we
were reminded that ILC members serve in a personal capacity, not as
representatives of their respective governments. The historical record shows
that a majority of ILC members tasked after World War II to create the ILC
argued in favor of the need for “obtaining a scientific restatement of the law
by independent experts . . . selected purely on their individual capacities and
in no sense as representatives of governments.”1 It was argued that political
appointments should be avoided. Articles 2 and 8 of the ILC Statute
implicitly reflect the desire of the drafting committee to staff the ILC with
independent members. “Paragraph one of Article 2 states that the [ILC] shall
consist of members who shall be persons of recognized competence in
international law, while Article 8 states that the electors shall bear in mind
that the persons to be elected to the commission should individually possess
the qualifications required (emphasis added).”2 A proposal directly linking
ILC members to their home governments, offered by those who feared that
independent members would become detached from the governments that
would ratify and enforce the international law that the ILC debated, was
rejected by the drafting committee.
Separating ILC members from their home governments, however, was
far from complete. The very process by which ILC members are elected
creates a link between governments and members. The ILC Statute outlines
the procedure by which individuals are elected as ILC members, requiring
that candidates be nominated by member states of the UN. It is illogical to
assume that governments would nominate an individual to be considered for
an ILC seat if they were not confident that the individual would reflect the
interests of the state. In addition to the nomination of one of its nationals to
the ILC, governments must also lobby others in order to secure sufficient
support in the General Assembly for their nominee to be elected to the ILC.
As such, the process by which ILC members are selected creates either a link

1

HERBERT W. BRIGGS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 30 (1960).

2

JEFFREY S. MORTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 11

(2000).
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with their nominating government or virtually insures that the ILC member
and her/his government will be in agreement in their jurisprudence.
During the summer of 1986 as I observed the ILC function, in both
formal and informal sessions, I was struck by the extent to which its members
appeared to reflect the general geostrategic stances taken by their home
governments. Eastern Bloc members seemed to follow the lead of the Soviet
Union member, rarely challenging each other on legal principle, while the
ILC members from the Western bloc tended to unify around countering
members from the East. Members from Latin America, Africa and Asia
raised North-South issues, much as their home governments did in overtly
political institutions such as the UN General Assembly.
Throughout my graduate studies, I remained in contact with many of the
ILC members and UN officials, particularly from the Office of the UnderSecretary-General for Legal Affairs, that I had encountered in the summer of
1986. We discussed the tendency of ILC members, at times, to act in ways
highly consistent with the governments that had nominated them to the ILC.
I reviewed the scholarly literature on the ILC and found little reference to the
status of its members as acting in individual capacity or as representatives of
their governments. I subsequently decided to draft my doctoral dissertation
on the ILC and systematically test the extent to which its members function
independently from their home governments.
In the late 1980s, international law as a field of study within political
science was on life support. Once the center of the study of international
relations, when mostly every subfield of international relations (international
law, international organization, and foreign policy) was taught using an
international law textbook, the field had fallen on hard times since the 1930s.
There are two particular reasons for the decline of the field. First,
international law and its advocates were effectively vilified as causes of the
Second World War. Not only did political realists argue that international law
and the institutions that it created, such as the League of Nations (League),
failed to prevent the rise of Hitler and Imperial Japan, but they were
responsible for having blinded the status quo powers (United States, United
Kingdom, France) to the rising danger. Realists, beginning with E.H. Carr
(1939) and continuing until and beyond Hans J. Morgenthau (1948), placed
the blame of World War II on idealists, international lawyers, and supporters
of the League.3 The second reason for the rapid decline of international law
as a field of academic endeavor after 1945 was the rise of the Cold War.
Conversations about international law, cooperation, or peace among nations
was a luxury, political and academic leaders argued, when confronting a

3 EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS, 1919-1939 (1939); HANS J.
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1948).
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global menace such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). It
was not until the 1990s, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the Communist
International was exposed for all of its weaknesses, that students regained
interest in international law. The challenge was finding international law
courses taught by professors with training in international law. After
spending half a century out of favor, there was a dearth of political science
professors whose area of expertise was international law. If someone wanted
to become a professor of international law during the Cold War, they
gravitated to law schools, which very quickly became the epicenters for the
field. Even at flagship research universities, it was not unusual to have no
international law professors. When I informed the Graduate Committee at the
University of South Carolina in 1991 that I had selected international law as
my area of focus, the response was, “We’ve never had a student concentrate
in that field.”
This is not to say that there were no international law experts in
academia or that meaningful research in the field was not taking place after
World War II. International law was such a popular field of study after World
War I that there were many tenured professors who remained in their posts
well into the 1970s. They were, however, out of step methodologically with
the field of political science. Beginning in the 1960s, Departments of Politics
and Departments of Government began changing their names to Departments
of Political Science. Swept up by the behavior revolution, professors of
politics sought to emulate the hard sciences, or at least psychology, in their
search for truth and knowledge. Our focus turned to quantifiable
observations, assigning numbers to human behavior and then using
sophisticated mathematical formulas to measure associations between
variables. Whether the shift from a traditional methodology, which utilized
insights and was largely descriptive, to the systematic analysis of data
associated with the positivist/behavioral approach was productive for the
field of international relations is an important, yet distinct, consideration.
What is clear is the impact of adoption of quantitative methods on the subfield of international law. With tenured academics in international law trained
in the traditional method, little interest was found among them to learn
statistical analysis and change their mode of investigation. As a result, as the
behavioral revolution took hold in political science, international law
scholars fell increasingly behind the times as the Cold War unfolded.
By the late 1980s, as the international arena underwent dramatic change,
graduate students interested in international law entered the field with the
requisite training in data collection, analysis, and statistical models. Those of
us who sought to resurrect the reputation of international law, as the postCold War environment emerged, did so from a “scientific” training
perspective.

06 - MORTON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

9/30/19 7:39 PM

Reflections on the International Law Commission

1069

A review of the scholarly literature of the ILC in 1990 revealed a field
dominated by the writings of ILC members, government officials, and
academics who relied upon the traditional research methodology.4 They
described what the ILC was working on, analyzed the reports generated by
the ILC, and suggested areas of international law in need of codification and
progressive development. There was no systematic, data-based analysis of
the ILC and the way that it functioned. My dissertation sought to fill that gap
in the literature, make a statement about the applicability of statistical
analysis in the field of international law, and uncover discernable patterns in
the ILC process.
My dissertation and the book manuscript that it produced analyzed
debate within the ILC in order to answer a set of questions:
1. Is the ILC insulated from world politics or a microcosm of it?
2. Has the Cold War’s end affected the functioning of the ILC?
The second question obviously depends on the findings from testing the
first. If the ILC was found to be insulated from world politics, specifically
from the home governments of ILC members, the Cold War’s end would
have limited impact on the process by which the ILC functions.
Measuring the extent to which ILC members function in a personal
capacity or in a way that reflects their governments requires a coding of their
interactions with each other. Since the ILC does not vote on the issues that
its members debate, the recorded discussions of the body were coded on a
five-point scale that ranges from disagreement to agreement.
A code sheet was developed that includes several variables relating to
ILC debate.
Table 1. Code Sheet.5
Year

Meeting

Member

State

Era

Bloc
Speaking

Bloc
Targeted

Topic

Code

As noted earlier, the Code category measures the degree of agreement
and disagreement among ILC members. A score of one (1) indicates
complete disagreement while a code of five (5) indicates complete agreement
with another ILC member. Three (3) reflects a neutral statement directed
towards another ILC member, with two (2) and four (4) indicating non-

4 Jeffrey S. Morton, The International Law Commission of the United Nations: Legal Vacuum or
Microcosm of World Politics, 23 INT’L INTERACTIONS 1, 37–54 (1997).
5

MORTON, supra note 2, at 82.
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neutral positions between the extremes (complete disagreement, complete
agreement).
The topics that were selected to analyze ILC debate were the Draft Code
of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (“Draft Code of
Crimes”) and the Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Criminal
Court Statute”). The Draft Code of Crimes was debated in the ILC between
1983 and 1989 (Cold War Era) and the Criminal Court Statute was debated
between 1990 and 1991 (Post-Cold War Era). Each time that an ILC member
specifically referenced a statement made by another during debate on the two
issues the statement was coded according to the degree of agreement or
disagreement. A total of 1,551 statements were coded, with 1,121 statements
coded on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind and 430 statements coded on the Statute of the International
Criminal Court Statute. This large-N study provides sufficient data for a
systematic empirical analysis of ILC debate with a high level of statistical
confidence.
Based upon their nationality, ILC members were categorized based
upon their country’s geographic bloc. Five regional blocs are utilized by the
UN in various organizational fora to promote geographical balance in
membership. The five regional blocs are Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin
America & Caribbean, and Western Europe & Others Group (WEOG). It is
well established that governments form regional alliances in the UN system.
What this study addresses is the extent to which ILC members do the same.
For both the Cold War Era (Draft Code of Crimes) and Post-Cold War
Era (Criminal Court Statute) two measures were examined: Intra-Bloc and
Inter-Bloc. Intra-Bloc interaction is measured by examining statements made
by ILC members that were directed towards other ILC members from the
same regional bloc. Inter-Bloc interaction is coded when members address
their comments towards ILC members from a different regional bloc.
During the Cold War Era, there were 149 Intra-Bloc statements by ILC
members coded. Table 2 reveals the degree of consensus and disagreement
among ILC members when they directly comment on the positions taken by
other members from the same regional bloc.
Table 2. Cold War Intra-Bloc ILC Debate.6
Regional Bloc
Western
Eastern
Latin America

6

Mean
4.110
5.000
4.200

Morton, supra note 4, at 47.

N
89
14
25

Standard Deviation
1.28309
0.00000
1.22474
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4.500
4.333

14
7
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0.85485
1.07542

According to the data, the Eastern Bloc of ILC members stated strong
agreement with other Eastern Bloc members consistently and without
exception. A standard deviation of zero (0) reveals perfect agreement of
Eastern Bloc members throughout the Cold War Era on the Draft Code of
Crimes topic debate. Lower levels of Intra-Bloc agreement were found with
each of the remaining regional blocs. This initial finding aligns with
geopolitics during the Cold War Era when Soviet domination of its sphere of
influence resulted in a highly unified bloc.
To determine whether ILC debate, and the perfect consensus among
Eastern Bloc members, changed as a result of the Cold War’s end data from
1990–91 (Criminal Court Statute) is presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Intra-Bloc ILC Debate, Cold and Post-Cold War Eras.7
Bloc
Western
Eastern
Latin America
Asian
African
Overall

Cold War Rating

Post-Cold War Rating

4.11
5.00
4.20
4.50
4.33
4.25

3.67
3.50
4.00
4.60
3.55
4.33

% Change
-10.00
-30.0
-4.76
+2.22
-21.11
+1.64

The data reveal that, overall, little changed in ILC debate in the postCold War era. The overall change in agreement was 1.64%, indicating that
only a modest increase in agreement occurred after the Cold War ended. A
closer examination of the data, however, indicates that the bloc that
experienced the greatest change was the Eastern Bloc. While ILC members
from the East European bloc experienced complete agreement with one
another during the 1983–1989 period, their consensus collapsed in the
aftermath of the Cold War’s end (3.5). The decline in agreement in the
Eastern Bloc (-30%) was greatest among all regional groupings.
While measuring intra-bloc ILC debate provides insights into the extent
to which the ILC reflects the larger international arena, an examination of
debate across regional groupings further supports the proposition that the ILC
is reflective of international politics. A total of 545 ILC statements during the
Cold War Era were directed by one ILC member to another from a different
regional bloc (Inter-Bloc debate). Because the Cold War’s end had the
7

MORTON, supra note 2, at 94.
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greatest initial impact on East-West relations, Inter-Bloc debate between
those two regional blocs is presented in Table 4.
Table 4. East-West Inter-Bloc Debate, Cold War & Post-Cold War Eras.
Bloc Dyads
East-West
All Inter-Bloc

Cold War Era
2.90 (90)
3.48 (543)

Post-Cold War Era

3.83 (60)
3.76 (271)

% Change
+32
+8.04

The data reveal that a dramatic change in interaction between ILC
members occurred in the post-Cold War era. While overall inter-bloc ILC
debate became more consensual in the post-Cold War era (+8.04%),
agreement across the East-West divide improved substantially (+32%) after
the Cold War.
A further investigation of the data indicates that the change in the EastWest divide was not evenly distributed. Statements made by Western bloc
ILC members directed toward their East European counterparts improved
from 3.16 (Cold War era) to 3.53 (post-Cold War era), while statements made
by East European ILC members directed towards Western bloc members
increased from 2.66 (Cold War) to 3.77 (post-Cold War era).8 Just as nations
from Eastern Europe responded to the Cold War’s end by seeking
accommodation with the West in an effort to emulate western values and
form of government, Eastern Bloc ILC members rapidly fell into agreement
with Western European members in ILC debate. The evidence provides
strong indication that the ILC, far from being insulated from world politics
is, rather, closely tied to changes in the international political order.
The data collected and analyzed also reveals changes in ILC debate
beyond the East-West divide. Table 5 shows changes in ILC debate between
the two eras (Cold War, post-Cold War) for East-West, North-South and
South-South agreement.
Table 5. Dialogue Rating for Key Relationships, Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras.
Supra-Regional Dyads
Cold War
Post-Cold War
Overall
3.66
3.74
East-West
2.90
3.83
North-South
3.69
3.78
South-South
4.14
3.76

In three measures (Overall, East-West, North-South), ILC members
experienced an increase in agreement during inter-bloc discussions, while
8

Id. at 98.
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debate exclusively between members from the South (Africa, Asia, Latin
America) experienced a decline in agreement in the post-Cold War era.
Established after World War II to promote the codification and
progressive development of international law, the ILC has the been the
subject of debate for the entirely of its 70-year existence. One area of
discourse has revolved around the nature of the ILC as either an insulated
chamber where legal experts suggest the direction of international rules or,
conversely, an extension of governments in pursuit of the same important
goal. The data collected and analyzed in this study calls into question the
insulation argument and appears to verify that the ILC is a microcosm of
world politics. A clear and hostile East-West divide was reflected in ILC
debate during the Cold War era, a relationship that changed dramatically in
the post-Cold war era. North-South relations in the ILC, as was the case in
international politics, improved in the ILC after the Cold War’s end, and
southern unity, a mainstay of Cold War world politics, declined in the postCold War era.
It is left to us to determine whether the intrusion of world politics into
the ILC is positive or negative. If the ILC is a mere extension of nation-states,
it can be argued, it is in need of repair. To reach a conclusion that the ILC is
not useful by virtue of the intrusion of world politics, however, fails to take
into account important legal considerations. As a body that codifies
international law with careful concern over the acceptance of its documents
by nation-states, the final drafts produced by the ILC stand a greater chance
of becoming binding international law.
The study undertaken here is limited in scope. It considers two related
topics, the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
and the Statute of the International Criminal Court, for a brief period of time
(1983-1991). Similar studies of the ILC’s work both prior to and following
the temporal domain of this study may shed further light on the nature of the
ILC debate processes.

